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Abstract: In traditional voting schemes with paper, pens and ballot-boxes, appropriate 
procedures are put in place to reassure that the result of the tally is correct. Considering 
that in internet voting errors or fraud will generally scale over a much greater fraction of 
votes, the demand to get strong reassurances as well, seems more than justified. With the 
ambition of offering a maximum degree of transparency, so-called verifiable schemes 
have been proposed. By publishing the relevant information, each voter may verify that 
her vote is included in the final tally and that accepted votes have been cast using proper 
voting material. Remarkably, this can be done while giving strong guarantees regarding 
the secrecy of the ballot at the same time. On the negative side, high transparency will 
generally make it easier for voters to demonstrate how they voted, e.g. towards a coercer. 
In this paper we propose an internet voting protocol that is verifiable and simultateously 
makes it practically impossible for vote-buyers or coercers to elicit the voters' behaviour. 
We compare its efficiency with existing work under equal degrees of coercion-resistance 
using an appropriate measure (𝛿). The contribution of our scheme lies in its efficiency 
during the most critical phases of the voting procedure, i.e. vote casting and tallying. 
Moreover, during these phases efficiency is insensitive to the desired degree of coercion-
resistance. 
 
 
1  Introduction 
 
The secrecy of the ballot serves as a means to protect citizens from external influence 
that pressures them into casting a vote that does not reflect their personal preference. The 
key to achievement lies in preventing that citizens demonstrate how they voted. In tradi-
tional paper-based schemes, precautions may require voters to fill out their ballots on 
site, possibly even in an isolated booth. Thus voters get the privacy it takes to render any 
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information they take out of the polling-station meaningless. Particularly, they cannot 
provide a coercer with a receipt, i.e. the information it takes to reveal the ballot they 
have cast. In internet voting, the quest for receipt-free and simlutaneously voter-
verifiable systems is still ongoing. In a first phase some propositions have been made 
that rely on strong assumptions, such as the existence of untappable channels [HS00] 
prior to voting event. (In practice voters would need to register in person each time they 
are asked to vote using the internet.) In 2005, Juels et al. achieved a breakthrough by 
proposing a receipt-free and yet verifiable protocol under strongly reduced trust assump-
tions [JCJ05] (henceforth refered to as the JCJ protocol). Remarkably their scheme is not 
only receipt-free but also highly resistant to coercers who want to push voters into hand-
ing out their credentials, voting at random or abstaining from casting a ballot. Schemes 
that succeed at circumventing these attacks of coercion are called coercion-resistant.1 For 
putting these advances in security into practice, Juels et al. still need to make strong 
assumptions regarding computational power of the tallying servers, which yield an im-
plementation of JCJ infeasible for large-scale elections, as shown in [CCM08]. 
 
Since 2005 there were a number of propositions that take the work of Juels et al. as a 
starting point and aim at rendering coercion-resistant internet voting practical - notably 
while preserving the security features of JCJ [Ar08, ABR10, CH11, SKH11, SHK11]. 
With one exception, the propositions need to be configured to achieve high degrees of 
coercion-resistance at the cost of efficiency.2. The price is always payed either by the 
voter or the tallying servers who still have to perform lots of computing. The present 
paper too proposes a protocol which is parametrizable regarding coercion-resistance. 
However, the price for a high degree of coercion-resistance is only payed during the 
setup-phase, i.e. the phase which is least time critical. Notably, the computations related 
to the setup phase specific to a vote only (post-registration) needs to be completed only 
after the last vote has been cast. Typically we may expect voting phases to be long 
enough for post-registration to complete, thus allowing the first vote to be cast just after 
the last voter has registered. Casting votes is just as fast as in JCJ and tallying becomes 
drastically faster. We hereby address the general notion that userfriendliness and the 
possibility to obtain the election results early are preconditions to the successful intro-
duction of internet voting. 
 
In  Section 2 we give an understanding of how coercion-resistance can be measured and 
in which respect the JCJ protocol is coercion-resistant. After presenting our protocol in  
Section 3 we compare its effciency with the known proposals from the literatue in  Sec-
tion 4 . Finally we make concluding remarks in  Section 5 . 
 
 
2  Coercion-Resistance and its Quantification 
 
                                                            
1As it is common in the technical literature, we do not distinguish between vote-buyers (people who give) and 
coercers (people who take). As far as we are concerned, a coercer is an algorithm designed to obtain the infor-
mation it takes to reveal whether a voter has adhered to some predefined instructions. 
2The only exception is the protocol proposed in [ABRTY10]. However, the scheme does not provide the same 
degree of verifiability as JCJ. This special case will be revisited in the context of  Section 3.4 and  Section 4.  
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There exists a variety of definitions of coercion-resistance. [KTV10] gives a nice 
overview of the various approaches. In their 2005 protocol proposition, Juels et al. 
include their own particular notion. The paper proves the protocol to be coercion-
resistant in terms of their definitions. Subsequent JCJ-related protocols that were 
introduced under a formal view on coercion-resistance, have essentially done so under 
this model, or under slight technical adaptations. 
 
All proposed protocols foresee the same defense strategy for the voter subjected to 
coercion: She hands out a fake credential to the adversary and casts the ballot of her 
choice through the anonymous channel using her real credential. In short, according to 
JCJ a protocol is coercion-resistant if an active non-adaptive adversary cannot 
distinguish dealing with the defense strategy from obtaining the real credential, with a 
non-negligible probability of success. In order to prove coercion-resistance of the JCJ 
protocol, the authors need to assume that along with the published result, the difference 
 between the number of cast votes 𝑛 and the number of the ones that are actually 
counted (due to using a valid voting credential) gives the adversary no advantage at 
succeeding with coercion (adversarial uncertainty). As we will argue, adversarial 
uncertainty will always be low enough to allow coercion, even without any quantitative 
prior knowledge regarding . 
 
In [KTV10], Küsters et al. introduce their notion of a measure for quantifying coercion-
resistance. They define the degree of coercion-resistance 𝛿 as the probability that the 
(reasonable) adversary will accept a run given that the voter submits to coercion minus 
the probability that the adversary will accept a run given that the voter applies the 
defense strategy. 3 They point out that there are opportunities of coercion already on the 
base of the expected and the effective tally, i.e. attacks that apply even in an ideal 
system. In that sense in JCJ it seems well justified to assume adversarial uncertainty with 
regard to the expected tally. However  is a value specific to coercion-resistant internet 
voting schemes. On one hand, since these schemes are not in practice yet, adversarial 
uncertainty with regard to  is to be expected in real life. On the other hand, since also 
voters are uncertain about , the coercer can still launch an attack that grounds on a wild 
guess Γ = 𝑐: He can offer money in case Γ ≤ 𝑐 or scratch the car if Γ > 𝑐. The 
reasonable voter will then submit to coercion if she believes that the vote cast with the 
fake credential would cause  to exceed 𝑐 by . Since in a scheme that is meant to be 
coercion-resistant there is no reason to actually take advantage of using fake credentials, 𝑐 might initially be chosen relatively small, thus yielding 𝛿 correspondingly high. 
 
Given the exclusion of  from adversarial uncertainty, some parametrizable JCJ-related 
protocols can be configured to achieve a degree of coercion-resistance that depends 
solely on the estimated . However in this case, the parameters have to be chosen such 
that there remain no meaningful gains in efficiency as compared with JCJ. In any case it 
                                                            
3If a vote buyer offers a voter 100 dollars for a vote when using a system that allows no defense strategy, the 
voter may expect to get the full reward when submitting to coercion and nothing otherwise. Intuitively speak-
ing, 𝛿 signifies the fraction of the 100 dollars voters may in average expect to additionally get from a vote 
buyer when submitting to coercion as opposed to applying a defense strategy in a 𝛿-coercion resistant system. 
Obviously, small 𝛿 values are what we are looking for. 
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seems that accelerating JCJ through parametrization inherently comes along with some 
loss in coercion-resistance. Nevertheless, this needs to be considered legitimate, 
knowing that JCJ were not coercion-resistant if not assuming adversarial uncertainty 
regarding  either. Finally, it cannot be estimated, whether coercion based on  promises 
less success than coercion based on the loss of coercion-resistance inherent to 
accelerating JCJ. 
 
The protocol we are about to introduce is 𝛿-coercion resistant in a parameter 𝛽. We will 
compare its performance with the others, under parameters 𝛽 that yield equal degrees of 
coercion-resistance 𝛿, where 𝛿 signifies the reduction of coercion-resistance compared 
with the JCJ-protocol. Remarkably, unlike , we are able to quantify 𝛿 for each of the 
protocols. 
 
 
3  Protocol 
 
Due to space constraints, we are not able to introduce JCJ beforehand. Instead we will 
indicate relevant divergencies from JCJ within our exposition. Due to the strong relation 
between both protocols, we find this approach to be justified. After showing the basic 
idea behind our protocol in  Section 3.1 and presenting the applied cryptographic 
primitives in  Section 3.2 , in  Section 3.3 we start off by introducing a basic version of 
our protocol. It already holds strong security features. In  Section 3.4 we will propose 
some slight enhancements due to improve verifiability. We chose this step-by-step 
approach for the sake of readability. We will informally justify the 𝛿-coercion resistance 
within the exposition of our protocol, i.e. assuming the ideality of the applied 
cryptographic primitives. The formal security proof is left for future work.  
 
 
3.1 The Idea 
 
Our scheme foresees the same defense strategy for voters under coercion as JCJ and the 
other verifiable coercion-resistant protocols known from the literature: They hand out an 
invalid credential and cast a vote to the public bulletin board (𝑃𝐵) using their real 
credential. The protocol should not enable the coercer to decide whether having obtained 
an invalid or a real credential, despite verifiability. Evidently this requires the voters' 
ability to cast votes to 𝑃𝐵 an arbitrary number of times, regardless of whether using real 
or invalid credentials.4 As a consequence 𝑃𝐵 may contain multiple votes cast using the 
same credential and votes cast with an invalid credential. Coercion-resistant protocols 
thus all need to include steps remove duplicates and authorize votes, prior to decryption. 
 
As in JCJ, our protocol divides the authorities put in charge of the voting system among 
registrars and talliers. Regarding corruption by a coercive adversary, we advise the 
reader to assume all registrars and a majority of talliers to be trustworthy. This could be 
                                                            
4If the number of accepted votes were limited, the coercer could test the received credential for validity by 
counting the number of times he can use it for casting votes. 
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weakened by requiring all registrars to be trustworthy only during the registration step 
and during the other phases by assuming that each voter knows a registrar of which she 
knows that he will not participate in a coercive attack against her. This weakening 
requires no change to the proposed protocol and the reasoning strictly follows [JCJ05]. 
Regarding verifiability (defined in [JCJ05] as strong verifiability) none of the authorites 
need to be trusted. The definition requires voters to be able to detect the exclusion of 
legitimate votes, changes to legitimate votes and the inclusion of multiple votes cast with 
the same credential. In  Section 3.4 we will change this definition as well and give more 
power to voters at verification under the notion of improved verifiability (the features of 
which are also mentioned in [JCJ05], however not formalized), such that they can 
additionally verify that all credentials used to cast votes are assigned to eligible voters, 
whereas the basic protocol would only allow voters to verify this given respective 
trustworthy majorities of registrars and talliers. To achieve improved verifiability in the 
full protocol, we will enhance the basic protocol accordingly in  Section 3.4 . The 
conclusion will be that our scheme reaches 𝛿-coercion resistance and a degree of 
verifiability equal to the JCJ-scheme, notably under equal assumptions regarding the 
authorities and adversarial power. After showing the applied primitives, we are ready to 
introduce our protocol. 
 
 
3.2  Cryptographic Primitives 
 
The new scheme applies the following cryptographic primitives. The ones not employed 
by the JCJ protocol are identified accordingly. At justifying coercion-resistance and 
verifiability in the course of our exposition, we assume primitives to be ideal.  
Multiparty ElGamal Cryptosystem with Threshold.  We propose all ciphertexts to be 
ElGamal over a pre-established multiplicative cyclic group (𝒢! ,⋅ ,1) of order 𝑞, for 
which the decisional Diffie-Hellman problem (DDHP) is considered to be hard. 5 
Assuming no decryption, ElGamal ciphertexts are meant not to disclose any information 
of the encrypted plaintext, even in the event that the plaintext-space is small and in the 
presence of other ciphertexts. 
 
We also propose the application of a multiparty computation scheme derived from 
[Pe91, GJK99] to preserve the confidentiality of encrypted values throughout the 
protocol. Thus, malicious decryption is only possible in the event of a conspiring 
majority (the number depends on the chosen threshold) of group members, i.e. registrars 
or talliers. 
                                                            
5We thus follow Civitas [5], which basically instantiates the JCJ protocol. However they do deviate in the 
choice of the underlying cryptosystem. The reason behind JCJ choosing a modified version of ElGamal (M-
ElGamal) lies in the reasoning  in their security proof. Although we could allow our protocol to adopt M-
ElGamal as well, we adhere to ElGamal, thus making its performance more easily comparable to most of the 
other known proposals for coercion-resistant internet voting. Further, the question whether to choose ElGamal 
or M-ElGamal does not seem sensitive to the design of a particular verifiable voting protocol, but rather to the 
desired security reassurances of the cryptosystem itself. Notably, recently ElGamal has been proved to have the 
beneficial IND-CCA1 property (resistance against non-adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks) just as much as M-
ElGamal [Li11]. Underlying our informal security argumentation within the protocol description, we assume 
that the plaintexts of all ciphertexts are unconditionally hidden, even when the plaintext space is restricted, and 
given the ideality of the remaining primitives. 
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Verifiable Mix-Nets.   Trustworthy mix-nets take an ordered set of ciphertexts and 
output re-randomized encryptions in random order such that the link is infeasible to be 
retrieved. They are implemented as a sequence of shuffles, each performed by a distinct 
mix-node. The link between elements from input and output is only retrieved in the 
event of all nodes conspiring. Correctness of execution is proved using NIZKP.   
 
Plaintext Equality Test PET.   Given two ElGamal encryptions 𝐸! and 𝐸!, the 
algorithm returns 𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒 if the plaintexts are equal and 𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒 otherwise. This is done by 
checking whether the decryption of (𝐸!/𝐸!)! equals  for a random value 𝑧 ∈ ℤ!. [JJ00] 
PET is verifiable and reveals no non-negligible information on the plaintexts. 
 
Additional Primitive M-PET.   Unlike JCJ the new scheme relies on an additional 
method for efficiently testing the equality among the elements encrypted by a set of 
ciphertexts as described in [We08]. Clearly, applying PET pair-wise on all elements of 
the set will result in quadratic running time. This is exactly the approach chosen in JCJ-
protocol and the reason for its inefficiency during the tallying stage. 
 
Given ciphertexts 𝑋!, . . .𝑋!, the modified PET (M-PET) raises all values to a random 
value 𝑧 ∈ ℤ!, and decrypts them to obtain the blinded plaintexts 𝑥!! = 𝐷𝐸𝐶(𝑋!!), . . . , 𝑥!! = 𝐷𝐸𝐶(𝑋!!). The blinded plaintexts can be efficiently compared 
for equality for instance by sequentially saving them in a hash-table. If a collision is 
detected, the algorithm returns 𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒, 𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒 otherwise. M-PET reveals no non-negligible 
information of the plaintexts, given that the discrete logarithm of any plaintext 𝑥! is 
unknown in the base of any plaintext 𝑥!, 1 ≤ 𝑖 < 𝑗 ≤ 𝑛. 
 
Communication Channels.   There is a public board 𝑃𝐵 which is used as a public 
broadcast channel. Voters post their votes to 𝑃𝐵 and the authorities post all output of the 
tallying phase to 𝑃𝐵. For the sake of simplicity we also assume that all public 
information, including public values from the employed PKI, is accessible on 𝑃𝐵. 
Further there is an untappable, authenticated channel from the registrars to the voters to 
hand the voters their credentials. Finally an anonymous channel is in place to allow 
casting votes anonymously to 𝑃𝐵. 
 
Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge Proofs NIZKP.   To provide verifiability, many 
computations throughout the protocol need to come along with non-interactive zero-
knowledge proofs. They allow voters to prove knowledge of a plaintext, proving 
plaintext membership of a given sub-domain of 𝒢!, authorities proving correct execution 
of PET, M-PET, correct mixing, encryption and decryption. We rely on the Fiat-Shamir 
heuristic for secure non-interactivity, i.e. negligible knowledge-errors and overwhelming 
witness-hiding.  
 
 
 
 
3.3  Basic Protocol 
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Pre-Registration.   The talliers jointly establish a multiparty ElGamal threshold PKI, 
publish their public key 𝜀 on 𝑃𝐵 and keep their shares of the corresponding private key 
to themselves. The registrars jointly establish a number of 𝛽 ⋅ 𝑁! random credentials, 
where 𝛽 denotes the security parameter underlying the degree of coercion-resistance 𝛿, 
and 𝑁! denotes the maximum expected number of individual voters ever to participate at 
elections hosted by the voting system. The credentials are tuples of the form (𝜎, 𝑖), 
whereas we use the terms 𝜎-credential and 𝑖-credential to refer to the respective 
components. Each component is random from 𝒢!, and only computable if the registrars 
maliciously co-operate. They jointly encrypt and post to 𝑃𝐵 each of the two components (E!(𝜎,𝛼!), E!(𝑖,𝛼!)) and memorize their share of the randomnesses 𝛼! and 𝛼!, both 
random from 𝑍!. We call the resulting list of encrypted credential components the 
credential-pool. Finally, they pass all 𝐸!(𝑖,𝛼!) through a mix-net and the talliers decrypt 
the output to form the list 𝒰𝒩ℒ < 𝑖 >, i.e. the list of 𝑖-credentials, the elements of 
which are unlinkable to the credential-pool by the coercer. The pre-registration step is 
needed only prior to the first election hosted by the voting system. Since valid 𝑖-
credentials need to be made public later in the protocol, the list 𝒰𝒩ℒ < 𝑖 > is meant to 
enable voters, as in JCJ, to lie about their credential already directly after registering. 
The credential-pool however will be processed at a later stage to allow the exclusion of 
votes cast with an invalid credential. 
 
 Registration.   The voter-roll is initialized as an empty list on 𝑃𝐵. After successful 
authentication for registration, the registrars choose an unassigned ciphertext tuple from 
the credential-pool and post it to the voter-roll along with an identifier of the voter. They 
hand voters their credential (𝜎, 𝑖), along with a proof that the credential corresponds with 
the ciphertext tuple. As all computations by registars and talliers, this procedure is 
conducted by the means of multi-party computation, such that only a malicious collusion 
can compute the secret, i.e. the plaintexts. The proof is implied by one proof from each 
registrar computed by the respective partial knowledge of the randomnesses 𝛼! and 𝛼!. 
Finally, the voter secretly chooses random elements 𝜎 ∈ 𝒢! and 𝚤 ∈ 𝒰𝒩ℒ < 𝑖 >. 
Whenever the coercer asks the voter to hand out her credential, she lies and hands out (𝜎, 𝚤). In the basic version of the protocol, the voter-roll only serves as a reference for 
locating the unassigned credentials from the credential-pool and for identifying the 
credentials to be retained in case voters loose eligibility. 
 
Post-Registration.   The registrars pass all ciphertext tuples (E!(𝜎,𝛼!), E!(𝑖,𝛼!)) of the 
credential-pool to a mix-net. From the output, the talliers decrypt the second component, 
i.e. the ciphertexts containing 𝑖-credentials. We call the resulting list 𝒰𝒩ℒ < 𝐸!(𝜎), 𝑖 >, 
as the coercer cannot link its elements neither to the credential-pool, nor to the non-
anonymous voter-roll. The post-registration step needs to be completed only prior to 
tallying, i.e. the phase in which voters cast their votes can be used for this step. Thereby 
the negative impact of the time-consuming mixnets is mitigated, or even fully 
compensated, given that the voting phase is sufficiently long. 
 
Vote Casting.   The voter selects the representation 𝑐 of her prefered candidate(s) from a 
set 𝒞 ⊂ 𝒢! we assume to be available on 𝑃𝐵. To cast the vote, she uses the anonymous 
channel and posts the two ciphertexts 𝐴 = Enc!(𝜎,𝛼!) and 𝐵 = Enc!(𝑐,𝛼!) to the 
 
 
 
 
 
- 8 - 
voting-board on 𝑃𝐵, along with her 𝑖-credential in plaintext. The voter aditionally needs 
to post one non-interactive zero-knowledge proof (NIZKP) per cipher-text. The first one 
requires voters to prove their knowledge of 𝜎. This is done indirectly by proving 
knowledge of 𝛼!. We thereby exclude the attempt to cast an illegitimate vote by copying 
and re-randomizing 𝜎-ciphertexts from 𝑃𝐵 undetectedly.6. The other proof shows that 𝑐 ∈ 𝒞. Since each authorized vote on the voting board will be decrypted during the 
tallying phase, requiring the second proof prevents coercers from forcing voters to select 𝑐 ∈ 𝒞 according to some prescribed pattern, thus obtaining a receipt (italian attack) 
[Di07] or from using the talliers as a decryption oracle to obtain 𝜎-credentials for 
subsequent votes. 
 
Apart from casting the 𝑖-credential this step is exactly the same as in JCJ. Although the 
coercer has no means of deciding to which among the uncontrolled voters the 𝑖-
credentials refer to, he still gains a quantifiable advantage at coercion. Recall that the 
voter under coercion had to choose an arbitrary value 𝚤 from 𝒰𝒩ℒ < 𝑖 > and pretend 
that this were his 𝑖-credential. The reasonable coercer will therefore observe the voting-
board to find out whether someone has cast a vote using 𝚤. If this is the case, the coercer 
will conclude that 𝚤 is in fact an 𝑖-credential that belongs to another voter and that the 
voter under coercion has revealed a false credential. 7 The probability that a voter is 
unfortunate enough to choose such a value as 𝚤 is less than !!. The further exhibition of 
our protocol shows that the coercer gains no additional information useful for 
distinguishing the behaviour of the voter under coercion. This will lead to the conclusion 
that our scheme is indeed 𝛿-coercion resistant, whereas 𝛿 = !!. 8 
 
Tallying.   In the beginning of the tallying step, the voting board contains tuples of votes (𝐴,𝐵, 𝑖) that may have been cast with wrong proofs, that were cast with the same 
credential as other votes (we call these votes duplicates), or that hold 𝐴- or 𝑖- 
components that do not correspond with a valid credential (𝜎, 𝑖) from 𝒰𝒩ℒ <𝐸!(𝜎), 𝑖 >. Prior to decryption and counting, these invalid votes need to be excluded. 
 
First, votes with wrong proofs, and votes with 𝑖-credentials that are not contained as the 
second component of an element enlisted by 𝒰𝒩ℒ < 𝐸!(𝜎), 𝑖 > are marked and 
excluded from further processing. In order to efficiently remove duplicates, the talliers 
consider only votes not cast with a distinct 𝑖-credential and apply M − PET on the 𝐴-
                                                            
6Due to this measure, votes cannot be cast by stealing the credentials of other voters, given a trustworthy 
majority of registrars (a majority could still compute 𝜎 and 𝑖) and talliers (a majority could compute the private 
decryption key and decrypt 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑚𝑎-credentials from list 𝒰𝒩ℒ − (𝐸!(𝜎), 𝑖) 
7Note, that this conclusion can only by drawn in the strict model proposed by JCJ, where it is assumed that 
exactly one voter is under coercion and that invalid credentials are only used to the degree of achieving adver-
sarial uncertainty regarding . If we now allow the coercer to believe that the vote cast with 𝚤 as the 𝑖-
credential is a fake vote (one with an invalid 𝜎-credential), coercion will become even more difficult. Howev-
er, we adhere to the strict model proposed in the JCJ paper. 
8The precise value of 𝛿 is !!!!!!!!!. Firstly, this is always smaller than !! and secondly, the difference is very small 
and irrelevant for reasonable 𝑁!. We thus justify the facilitation of saying 𝛿 = !!. 
 
 
 
 
 
- 9 - 
components of votes cast with the same 𝑖-component.9 At this stage a last-vote-counts or 
a first-vote-counts policy is enforced. Note, that the steps described so far could also be 
performed each time a vote is posted, i.e. prior to the tallying stage. 
 
To authorize votes, the 𝑖-credentials are used to link the 𝐴- and 𝐵-components of the 
votes with the encrypted 𝜎-credentials from 𝒰𝒩ℒ < 𝐸!(𝜎), 𝑖 > to form tuples (𝐸!(𝜎),𝐴,𝐵). These tuples are passed to a mixnet. We call the output 𝒰𝒩ℒ <𝐸!(𝜎),𝐴,𝐵 >, since its elements are unlinkable neither to 𝒰𝒩ℒ < 𝐸!(𝜎), 𝑖 > and the 
voter-roll, nor to the votes on the voting board. For each element, the talliers apply PET 
on the first two components. If the algorithm returns true, 𝐴 is an encryption of a valid 𝜎-credential. In that case, the corresponding ciphertext 𝐵 is decrypted and counted in the 
tally, otherwise the vote is excluded from further processing. Note, that since votes are 
being assessed for the validity of 𝜎-credentials encrypted by the 𝐴-component, we may 
not apply M − PET at this stage - such an approach would allow the coercer to check the 
validity of 𝜎 by the means of another vote cast by him with an 𝐴-component encrypting 
e.g. 𝜎!, i.e. a value the logarithm of which is known in base 𝜎. The basic protocol is 
illustrated in fig. 1. 
 
 
Fig. 1 Basic Protocol 
 
Credential Retention.   As implied above, our scheme aims at allowing voters to re-use 
the same credential (𝜎, 𝑖) at numerous voting events. We therefore need to provide a 
mechanism that disallows voters to cast votes after loosing eligibility, for instance when 
they leave the voting district. Removing their credential from the credential-pool at post-
registration is clearly not an option, since the coercer could verify the validity of the 
previously received 𝑖-credential by observing whether the value still appears on 𝒰𝒩ℒ < 𝐸!(𝜎), 𝑖 > after the post-registration step of the following election. The 
                                                            
9We hereby adhere to the approach proposed by Smith and Weber. However unlike Smith / Weber, we apply M − PET only at removing duplicates, not at authorizing votes as proposed by them. Since at the current stage 
we do not check the validity of the values encrypted by 𝐴, and since the coercer does not know the discrete 
logarithm of any valid 𝜎-credential in the base of any other, the coercer learns nothing that is useful for his 
attack. 
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protocol therefore defines credential-retention by having the registrars compute a new 𝜎-
credential and replace (E!(𝜎,𝛼!)) on the credential-pool with an encryption of this new 
value. The encryption of the 𝑖-credential however remains the same. Finally, the voter's 
ID on the voter-roll is marked as non-eligible. The new credential in the credential-pool 
is marked and may not be assigned to new voters, since the coercer would know the true 
value of the 𝑖-credential, in case it previously belonged to a voter controlled by him. 
Clearly, moving voters will not be able to use their retained credential for voting, since 
such votes would be discarded at vote authorization. Just as all unassigned credentials in 
the credential-pool, the new credential can only be used for voting unnoticed in the 
event of colluding registrars or talliers (a case to be ruled out in the full protocol). 
 
Now we observe whether credential retention gives the adversary an advantage at 
judging if the voter who lost eligibility previously lied to him. We consider the two cases 
where the voter had submitted to coercion and where she applied the defense strategy. In 
the first case, the coercer would expect the distribution of , i.e. votes not to be counted, 
to remain the same and the number of counted votes to decrease by one. In the second 
case, he would also expect  to decrease by one. This is exactly the distinguishing factor 
we need to assume irrelevant by the means of adversarial uncertainty when proving 
coercion-resistance of the JCJ-protocol, i.e. independent of credential retention. 
 
 
3.4  Full Protocol and Improved Verifiability 
 
Evidently, the basic protocol complies with the definition of verifiability in the JCJ paper 
- it allows to detect the exclusion of legitimate votes, changes to legitimate votes and the 
inclusion of multiple votes cast with the same credential. Notably the definition already 
captures the commonly quoted requirement imposed on verifiable systems, i.e. that 
voters need to be able to verify that their vote has been cast as intended, recorded as cast 
and tallied as recorded. Regarding verifiability, our basic scheme is thus not less 
powerful than the well-known coercion-resistant scheme by Araújo et al. [ABR10, 
AFT07, Ar08]. However, the JCJ paper mentions that it may be desirable for any 
election observer to verify, that credentials have only been assigned to voters whose 
names are on a published roll. Indeed, the JCJ-protocol provides this kind of 
verifiability. However our basic protocol only does, when assuming trustworthy 
majorities among registrars and talliers. In order to ensure that one can detect the event 
where registrars or talliers collude to cast votes with a credential enlisted by the 
credential-pool but not by the voter-roll, we propose an enhancement to the tallying 
step. 
 
In the tallying step prior to decryption, the voter-roll is passed to a mixnet which outputs 
the list 𝒰𝒩ℒ < 𝐸!(𝜎) >. The coercer cannot link the entries of this list to the entries of 
the voter-roll. After votes from 𝒰𝒩ℒ < 𝐸!(𝜎),𝐴,𝐵 > with 𝐴-components that encrypt 
an invalid 𝜎-credential have been excluded from further processing (at vote 
authorization as described above), the talliers apply M − PET on all 𝐴-components of 𝒰𝒩ℒ < 𝐸!(𝜎),𝐴,𝐵 > and all entries in 𝒰𝒩ℒ < 𝐸!(𝜎) >. If for an 𝐴-component of 𝒰𝒩ℒ < 𝐸!(𝜎),𝐴,𝐵 > no collision is detected with any of the entries of the 𝒰𝒩ℒ <𝐸!(𝜎) >, the corresponding vote is obviously cast with a credential that corresponds 
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with an entry in the 𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 − 𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙 that has not been assigned to any voter. These 
votes are excluded from further processing, i.e. their 𝐵-components are not decrypted. 
The full protocol is illustrated in fig. 2. Note, that since all input values to 𝑀 − 𝑃𝐸𝑇 are 
encryptions of valid 𝜎-credentials, no discrete logarithm of any value in the base of any 
other is known. Therefore the coercer does not get any advantage, and it is justified to 
apply 𝑀 − 𝑃𝐸𝑇. 
 
 
Fig. 2 Enhancement to the basic  protocol to achieve full protocol 
 
 
4  Efficiency 
 
 
 
Fig. 3 The two drawings show the parameter 𝜷 in dependence of the degree of 
coercion-resistance 𝜹. The diagram on the left shows the case for 1000 voters and 
1000 votes on the voting board, the one on the right 100000 voters and 100000 votes 
on the voting board. 
 
We now present the efficiency properties of our protocol through comparison with the 
schemes known from the literature. In the schemes by Clark et al. [CH11] and Schläpfer 
et al. [SHK11], voters associate their vote with non-anonymous information on 𝑃𝐵 that 
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refers to themselves. In order to mislead coercers they randomly choose a set of other 
voters they additionally associate their vote with, thus forming an anonymity set of size 𝛽.10 In the case of Clark et al., the computation time on the voter's platform scales in the 
parameter 𝛽. Particularly the number of modular exponentiations is 4 ⋅ 𝛽 + 10, 
assuming a set 𝒞 of two candidates to choose from. However, the tallying stage remains 
unaffected by the parameter and efficient, i.e. it is equally efficient as our basic protocol. 
The tallying time of our full protocol takes slightly longer, depending on the size of the 
mix-net, but not more than twice as long. In Schläpfer et al. the tallying time scales in 𝛽, 
i.e. a mix-net during the tallying stage will need to perform 48 ⋅ 𝛽 ⋅ 𝑁 modular 
exponentiations, where 𝑁 denotes the number of cast votes and when assuming four 
mix-nodes. The scheme by Spycher et al. [SKH11] does not rely on anonymity sets. 
Instead the registrar who enjoys the voter's trust even after registration, assigns her an 
average number of 𝛽 votes, under uniform distribution, cast with a false credential. 
Clearly this will also scale the time of tallying, 156 ⋅ 𝛽 ⋅ 𝑛 + 156 ⋅ 𝑁 is the number of 
modular exponentiation due to the most expensive steps, where 𝑛 denotes the number of 
voters. Fig.3 shows the choice of 𝛽 in dependence on the desired degree of coercion-
resistance for the schemes with a corresponding parameter.11 The scheme by Araújo et 
al. [ABR10] is by nature efficient at all stages and coercion-resistant with 𝛿 = 0. 
However, as shown in  Section 3.4 , it gives no means to verify whether authorities have 
created illegitimate credentials and cast extra votes. 
 
We conclude that our protocol is efficient at both vote-casting and tallying. It does scale 
over 𝛽, however only during the non-critical pre-registration and post-registration steps. 
We therefore omit exact quantification. Further our protocol allows high levels of 
coercion-resistance, even under relatively small parameters. Since the pre-registration 
step may be conducted independent from the voting procedures, it will not have a 
negative impact on the elections. Also the post-registration step can begin right after last 
voter has registered and only needs to end prior to tallying. The phase when citizens cast 
their votes should give enough time for completion. 
 
 
                                                            
10In both cases coercion-resistance of degree 𝛿 = 0 can be achieved by selecting 𝛽 = 𝑛, where 𝑛 is the number 
of voters. Moreover, it is sufficient for coerced voters to hide their votes in the anonymity set of size 𝑛, assum-
ing adversarial uncertainty regarding the number of such votes. However this is a strong requirement, given 
large 𝑛. 
11In  Section 3.3 we have shown that the coercion-resistance of our scheme follows 𝛿 = !!. It is easy to see that 
the same relation applies to the scheme by Spycher et al. as well. In the case of the protocols that rely on 
anonymity sets we have followed the definition from [KTV10]. To obtain 𝛿, we need to compute   !∈! 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑟|(𝜎, 𝑖)) − 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑟|(𝜎, 𝚤)), where the condition in the first term signifies submission to coercion, 
the condition in the second one signifies applying the defense strategy. 𝑅 denotes the set of results (i.e. the 
number of votes assigned to the voter under coercion) that the coercer would accept. Note, that inherent to 
assuming a reasonable coercer the difference within the sum is inherently never negative. Prob(𝑟|(𝜎, 𝑖) we 
compute as 𝐹!(𝑟), where 𝐹! is the distribution function of a binomial distribution with 𝑁 trials and a success 
probability of !!!!!!, where 𝑁 denotes the number of cast votes and 𝑛 the number of voters. Prob(𝑟|(𝜎, 𝚤)) we 
compute as 𝐹!(𝑟 − 1), where 𝐹! again is the distribution function of a binomial distribution, this time with 𝑁 − 1 trials. 
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5  Conclusion 
 
The verifiable JCJ-protocol offers coercion-resistance under conditions that disallow an 
implementation for large-scale elections. The proposed solutions that followed either 
compromise verifiability or require a trade-off between the degree of coercion-resistance 
and efficiency during the critical phase of tallying or the process of casting a vote. Our 
proposal too requires more computation than conservative verifiable schemes. However 
we have shown that compared with other schemes, the factor that scales the computation 
time is small for relatively high degrees of coercion-resistance. Moreover, the expensive 
computations specific to coercion-resistance can be performed while the polls are open, 
i.e. while nobody is waiting. 
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